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TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION, CAPITAL MAINTENANCE 
AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP 
 









  We study optimal growth models à la Nelson and Phelps (1966) where 
labor resources can be allocated either to production, technology adoption or 
capital maintenance. We first characterize the balanced growth paths of a 
benchmark model without maintenance. Then we introduce the maintenance 
activity via the depreciation rate of capital. We characterize the optimal allocation 
of labor across the three activities. Though maintenance deepens the 
technological gap by diverting labor resources from adoption, we show that it 
generally increases the long run output level. Moreover we find that equilibrium 
maintenance and adoption efforts respond in opposite directions to policy or 
technology shocks. When a technological shock occurs, the reduction of the 
equilibrium technological gap is incompatible with welfare maximization. Finally, 
we find that the long term output response to policy shocks is slightly higher in 
the presence of maintenance. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is a common view of economic development according to which tech-
nology transfers from the industrialized countries is a perequisite for the
developing countries to take oﬀ. This view is completely in line with the
neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956). In the latter framework, the unique
w a yt oe n s u r el o n gt e r mg r o w t hi nG D Pp e rc a p i t ai sap e r m a n e n tr i s ei n
the stock of technological knowledge of the economy. Capital accumulation,
measured for example by the investment rate, only matters in the short term
dynamics.
How have technology transfers performed over the past decades? There exists
a huge literature (notably empirical) on this subject. One of the main issues
investigated concerns the existence of spillover eﬃciency beneﬁts to host
country economies from technology transfer projects (see the excellent survey
of Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Therefore, the focus of the analysis is not
only the performance of these projects in the particular ﬁrms and geographic
areas where they are implemented, but also and especially their sectoral and
macroeconomic implications.
An unavoidable aspect of technology transfers performance concerns the exis-
tence of numerous barriers to technology adoption in the host countries. In a
recent empirical inspection into the nature of these adoption costs, based on
the reported performances of some 50 major international projects conducted
by the 36 largest Canadian consulting engineering ﬁrms in developing coun-
tries, Niosi, Hanel and Fiset (1995) conclude that ”technology transfer costs
are positive and mostly concentrated in the area of training”. The costly
nature of technology adoption is a recognized feature. In a very known con-
tribution, Parente and Prescott (1997) have already shown that diﬀerences
in the cost of technology adoption account for a substantial part of the diﬀer-
ences in income across countries. Naturally, for a technology transfer project
to be successful and to yield substantial sectoral spillovers, a necessary con-
dition is to reduce drastically the size of the adoption costs. These costs are
twofold. Some are related to the unavoidable learning and (slow) diﬀusion
of technologies (see David, 1990, for a masterful historical perspective), and
some come from the institutional arrangements at work in the host countries.
The second class of barriers to adoption does not depend on the nature of
the technology transfers, in contrast to the ﬁrst one. Instead, these bar-
riers entirely rely on the host country’s education and trade policies. In
3particular, the trade policies restricting the access to the domestic markets
and/or impeding majority ownership by foreign ﬁrms are likely to discour-
age technology transfers. Since the eighties, many developing countries have
undertaken the necessary reforms to get rid of these barriers. It is the case
in Turkey (from the early 80s), Mexico (from 1984) and India (from 1991)
for example. India’s liberalization reform of its technology policy in 1991 is a
good illustration of this trend. In particular, the reform permitted majority
ownership by foreign ﬁrms and streamlined the approval process for collabo-
ration contracts for technology transfer. Whether this reform has generated
the needed spillovers is a very debated issue as highlighted by Vishwasrao
and Bosshardt (2001).
The same debate is indeed taking place on the Mexican and Turkish expe-
rience. Using a large panel data of Mexican manufacturing ﬁrms during a
period of trade liberalization (1984-1990), Grether (1999) ﬁnds that technol-
ogy transfer projects (via foreign direct investment) do not lead to signiﬁcant
spillovers at the sector level. According to the classic spillover argument, the
sole presence of foreign ﬁrms generates externalities in favor of domestic
ﬁrms. The main ideas underlying this argument are the following. The in-
troduction of new products and techniques by foreign ﬁr m si n d u c e si m i t a t i o n
by the domestic ﬁrms. More positive eﬀects in terms of eﬃciency are likely
to be generated thanks to an increased competitive pressure and a better
training of domestic workers. However, as Grether’s study shows, things are
not that virtuous in real life, and countervailing forces may oﬀset the posi-
tive eﬀects mentioned just above. For example, the very limited capacity of
technological absorption of the developing countries makes problematic even
a rough imitation of the imported technologies. Moreover, labor resources
are scarce, and labor mobility is generally strictly limited by the wage dif-
ferential existing between the subsidiaries of the multinational corporations
and the domestic ﬁrms. Concerning the competition argument, it turns out
that the increasing competition induced by the presence of the latter sub-
sidiaries generally leads to drive the local ﬁrms out of the market, and not
to any modernization or gains in eﬃciency in the local industries. Overall, a
frequently observed situation is the creation of ”...enclaves out of which tech-
nology does not diﬀuse” (Grether, p. 1292), a situation previously pointed
at by Kokko (1994). This happens especially when the imported technology
is sophisticated. The same lessons are drawn from the Turkish experience
4by Pamukcu and Cincerra (2001).
The absence of clear spillovers challenges the optimistic view of technology
transfer, and indeed, it casts a doubt on the usefulness of technology adoption
in an environment where the labor resources are scarce and the technological
absorption is tenuous. This is especially true if we take into account the
increasing sophistication of the new technologies. What could be an optimal
technology adoption pace for a developing country? Are there any alternative
policy to adoption? We shall address these issues in this paper.
In particular, we shall advocate that the maintenance of the technologies in
use and the associated stock of capital is a very good alternative to adoption
in terms of long term income per capita. Surprisingly, the recent macroeco-
nomic literature has almost disregarded maintenance.1 Among the very few
exceptions dealing with maintenance in the macroeconomy, one can enumer-
ate McGrattan and Schmitz (1999), Licandro and Puch (2000) and Collard
and Kollintzas (2001).2 All these papers are mostly concerned with the cycli-
cal properties of maintenance and its implications for the business cycle. In
particular, the connection between the adoption and maintenance decisions
is not studied. This omission is certainly not motivated by quantitative con-
siderations. Actually, maintenance and adoption costs are comparable in
terms of GDP. While the former are estimated to be around 6% of GDP
(see McGrattan and Schmitz, 1999, in the Canadian case), the latter typi-
cally amount to about 10% in developed countries as reported in Jovanovic
(1997). There are further reasons to believe that adoption and maintenance
decisions are indeed connected, and should be treated as such. An obvious
reason is that many ﬁrms have in mind the maintenance implications of their
adoption decisions. A ﬁrm can disregard the adoption of a new technology if
it anticipates a costly pace of maintenance costs both in physical and human
capital. This is even more crucial when technological advances are embodied
in capital.
There is another reason to treat maintenance and adoption within the same
framework. Actually, just like adoption, maintenance diverts resources from
the other sectors and activities, it consequently ”competes” with adoption
1Not so in the seventies with the notable contributions of Feldstein and Rothschild
(1974), and Nickell (1975).
2Another contribution dealing with investment and capital maintenance is due to
Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit (2002), but it takes a deliberate microeconomic approach.
5in this respect. Maintenance activities do require human and physical cap-
ital just like adoption, though one can reasonably think that adoption is
more intensive in human capital. The labor opportunity cost of maintenance
is stressed in Tiﬀen and Mortimore (1994) who studied the role of capi-
tal maintenance and technology adoption in the growth recovery of Kenya.
Maintenance expenditures are indeed included in social cost-beneﬁta n a l y s i s
in this country case but ”...it is not always realized that labor on mainte-
nance may have a rising opportunity cost...this requires a wise management
of recurrent maintenance costs if the beneﬁts of investment are to be lasting”.
In this paper, we study the outcomes of optimal growth models ` al aNelson
and Phelps (1966) where the labor resources can be allocated freely either
to production, adoption or maintenance. Technological progress is disem-
bodied, the central planner has to decide how much labor has to be devoted
to increasing the stock of knowledge of the economy (adoption or imitation)
and how much labor should be assigned to the maintenance of capital. Labor
on maintenance decreases the depreciation rate of capital as in McGrattan
and Schmitz (1999). A fraction of labor is devoted to adopt the innova-
tions coming from abroad. There is no R&D activity and labor resources are
ﬁxed. This is likely to generate an everlasting technological gap as in the
original Nelson and Phelps’ contribution. In this set-up, could it be a case
where capital maintenance is preferred to adoption? What is the optimal
allocation of human capital resources across activities? If presumably the
maintenance activity diverts labor from adoption and is therefore likely to
deepen the technological gap, does it in counterpart rise the (detrended) level
of income as it reduces the negative impact of capital depreciation? How do
maintenance and adoption decisions shift under exogenous changes in the
pace of technological progress, and how does this aﬀect the economy? Does
maintenance improve the responsiveness of the economy to policy shocks?
These questions will be tackled along this paper. Since the short run dynam-
ics of the considered models do not add much to the results obtained for the
balanced growth paths, we restrict our analysis to the latter.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to brieﬂy
present and characterize the steady state equilibrium of a benchmark model
of adoption ` al aNelson and Phelps (1966) without maintenance. Section 3
incorporates maintenance in the benchmark model and examines how this
aﬀects the properties of the model in the steady state. Section 4 concludes.
62 The benchmark model
We consider an economy which comprises a continuum of inﬁnite lived agents,
indexed from 0 to 1. All individuals share the same preferences that are





where 0 < β < 1 is a constant discount factor and Ct is consumption in
period t. There is no desutility of labor and labor supply is exogenous and
equal to one. This is the simplest way to model (skilled) labor scarcity in an
economy, one of the main characteristics of developing economies.
The economy includes two sectors: the ﬁnal good sector and the imitation
(or technology adoption) sector. The functioning of the imitation sector is as
follows. We denote by A0
t−1 the state of knowledge at the beginning of period
t, that is the best technological level achievable, which could be interpreted
as the technological level of the industrialized countries. A0
t is assumed to
grow exogenously at a factor γ, A0
t = γt, ∀t ≥ 0, with γ > 1. The production
function of the imitation sector resembles Nelson and Phelps’ speciﬁcation
(1966). Denote by At−1 the technological level in use in the economy at the
beginning of period t. The imitation sector increases this level over time
according to the following production function:








0 < θ < 1.
ut represents the amount of labor resources devoted to imitation in period
t,a n ddt is an exogenous variable capturing the potential shocks to this
sector. An increase in dt may for example reﬂect an exogenous improvement
in the skills on the labor force. It may also reﬂect a trade policy reform
easing technology transfers. Note that imitation (or adoption) has decreasing
returns to labor, ie. is concave with respect to u. Doubling the labor fraction
devoted to adoption will increase the technology in practice level by a factor
strictly lower than two. This assumption mimics the hypothesis usually done
in the R&D literature according to which there exist decreasing returns to
the research eﬀo r t( f o re x a m p l e ,s e eJ o n e s ,1995, or Caballero and Jaﬀe,
71993). We assume that just like research, technology adoption is subject to
ac r o w d i n ge ﬀect which mainly reﬂects redundancy in the adoption eﬀort.
We assume that A0
−1 >A −1,t h a ti si n i t i a l l y ,a tt = 0, the technology in
use in the economy is below the technology frontier, which is a necessary
assumption as far as we are concerned with developing countries. We also













Given that the total labor resources are normalized to one, the assumption
dt < 1i ss u ﬃcient to ensure that At is a (strict) convex combination of At−1
and A0
t−1. Hence we have always At−1 <A t <A 0
t−1 as long as ut is nonzero.
At any date t, there is no way to close the gap between the technology in use
and the technology frontier. This is the simplest way to model a limited
capacity of technological absorption. This crucial aspect can be also
captured via the explicit concept of technological gap developed by Nelson
and Phelps, (1966). In eﬀect, following these authors, the technological gap,
TGt,a tt is by deﬁnition
A0
t−1−At−1











The technological gap depends on the adoption eﬀort ut a n do nt h ee x o g e n o u s
productivity variable dt. Under our assumptions, it is always strictly positive.
In particular, it does not vanish in the the steady state, a remarkable property
of Nelson and Phelps’ adoption models which makes them most appropriate
to study economic development problems.
The ﬁnal good sector has the traditional structure, with notably a Cobb-






Kt−1 is the stock of capital available at the end of period t−1, Lt is amount of
labor assigned to the ﬁnal good sector. Technological progress, represented
b yt h es t o c ko fk n o w l e d g ea v a i l a b l ea tt h eb e g i n n i n go fp e r i o dt, At−1,i s
disembodied. We now study the central planner problem corresponding to
this economy.
82.1 The central planner problem
The fundamental decision to be taken by a central planner in such an econ-
omy is very simple: For a given stock of capital K−1, and stock of knowledge
A−1, how much labor has to be devoted to increase the stock of knowledge













Kt =[ 1− δ]Kt−1 + It, (2)









1=Lt + ut, (4)
Yt = Ct + It, (5)
given A−1 and K−1 and the corresponding positivity conditions (notably
0 ≤ ut ≤ 1). δ is the capital depreciation rate and It is gross investment.
The interior solution of this optimization problem is characterized by the







































plus the standard transversality conditions. ω and λ are the multipliers
associated with the labor market clearing condition and with the law of ac-
cumulation of knowledge respectively. ωt can be interpreted as the shadow
wage at t,a n dλt as the shadow price of knowledge at this date. Equation (6)
is the standard Euler equation obtained from Ramsey growth models. Equa-
tion (7) provides the optimal rule for knowledge accumulation. The marginal
productivity of knowledge (evaluated in terms of the marginal utility at t+1
because of our choice of timing) should be equal to its shadow price at t,
9minus the potential gain in the value of knowledge from t to t +1 . E q u a -
tions (8)-(9) are the optimality conditions with respect to the labor variables.
Since labor is homogenous, the marginal productivity of labor devoted either
to production or to adoption should be equal to the shadow wage.
We now investigate the steady state properties of the dynamic system (1)-(9).
2.2 The balanced growth paths
We assume a logarithmic utility function. Along the balanced growth path
ut and Lt are constant, and the remaining variables grow at constant rates.
Denoting by gX the long-run growth factor of a variable Xt and X its long
run level, we have the following properties:
Proposition 1 If A0
t growth at rate γ > 1, the all other variables growth at
strictly positive rates with
gA = γ






These properties are trivially checked by writing the restrictions among the
diﬀerent growth rates that the system (1)-(9) impose. To compute the long
run levels, the same approach has to be followed. In order, to simplify a little




























1−α =( 1 − δ)K + Iγ
1
1−α
Y = C + I






10It is then quite easy to prove that the previous stationary system always
exists and is unique.
Proposition 2 Since γ > 1:
(i) a unique stationary equilibrium exists for our economy,
(ii) the long run technological gap being TG =
γ−1














The proof is in the appendix. The comparative statics results are important
to understand the basic mechanisms at work in our model. The same mech-
anisms will work in the extension considered afterwards. First note that if
the productivity of the adoption activity increases, ie. d rises, the fraction
of labor devoted to adoption goes down but the technological gap goes down
too. Given the expression of the long run technological gap, this means that
the product du θ rises when d goes up despite the reduction in the adoption
eﬀort. It is not hard to understand this outcome. Productivity improve-
ments in adoption allow to increase the stock of knowledge even with a lower
labor contribution to this activity. In such a case, more labor is assigned to
production. If the increase in d compensates the decrease in u, ie. if du θ
increases, so that the stock of knowledge keeps on rising, the economy gains
a double advantage: More production (and so more consumption and more
welfare) and lower technological gap.
When γ increases, the technological gap is likely to rise sharply if the econ-
omy does not increase substantially its imitation eﬀort. However if the adop-
tion eﬀort increment is too big, a very low fraction of labor will be left for
production, and the consumption level and welfare of the economy will fall
dramatically. There is a clear trade-oﬀ here. In our model, this trade-oﬀ
is settled as follows: While the labor allocation to adoption will rise, it will
not rise enough to oﬀset the negative eﬀect of the exogenous technological
acceleration on the technological gap.
Let us introduce maintenance now.
113 Incorporating capital maintenance in the
adoption model
We introduce maintenance of capital as a labor service. Labor can be devoted
to a third activity, maintenance, and we denote by m. The clearing condition
of the labor market becomes:
1=Lt + ut + mt. (10)
We only consider preventive maintenance in this paper. Maintenance services
allow to reduce the physical depreciation of capital, as in McGrattan and
Schmitz (1999), Licandro and Puch (2000) and Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit
(2002).3 In such a framework, capital evolves over time according to the
following law of motion:
Kt =[ 1− δ(mt)]Kt−1 + It. (11)
By choosing m,t h eﬁrms or the central planner determine the depreciation
rate δ(m). The depreciation rate should fulﬁll the following requirements
(see for example, Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit, 2002):
(i) δ(m) > 0, δ (m) < 0 δ  (m) > 0
(ii) limm→1 δ(m)=δ
Conditions (i) are the expected positivity, monotonicity and convexity re-
quirements. Condition (ii) ensures that the economy can not go below a
minimal value corresponding to the “natural” depreciation of capital, δ.
This is the unique deviation considered in this section with respect to the
benchmark model. In particular, the adoption side of the model is unchanged,
ie. equation 3) is not altered. This means that the adoption decision is only
connected to the maintenance decision through the labor resources constraint
(10). In certain cases, the pace of adoption can slowdown because of the ex-
pected induced maintenance costs, as we mentioned in the introduction. This
is especially the case when technological advances are embodied in capital
goods. If technological progress is disembodied, the link between capital ac-
cumulation and the implementation of innovations is broken down, and one
can perfectly disconnect the two decisions. In such a case, adoption and
3In contrast, corrective maintenance, namely the repair of equipment failures, would
require a much more complicated analytical treatment.
12maintenance interact via labor resources competition. This is the approach
followed in this paper. Technological progress is disembodied, the mainte-
nance services aﬀect the pace of capital accumulation and the adoption eﬀorts
shape the pace of technological progress within the country.
Both activities aﬀect the production function, via the capital input for main-
tenance, and directly through total factor productivity At for adoption. Ac-
tually there is a third (indirect) eﬀect on production coming from these two
decisions: As u and/or m rise, there is less labor left for production. Hence,
despite its simple structure, our model presents enough interaction channels
to allow for a non-trivial discussion. Beside the derivation of the optimal
allocation of resources across activities, a very interesting issue arises in our
set-up, as mentioned in the introduction: If maintenance diverts labor from
adoption and is therefore likely to deepen the technological gap, does it in
counterpart rise the level of income since it tends to increase the stock of cap-
ital? The above stated three eﬀe c t so fm a i n t e n a n c ea n da d o p t i o no no u t p u t
suggest that this question may not be settled in a simple analytical fashion.
We tackle it below after characterizing the central planner problem.
3.1 The central planner problem
The central planner problem is the same as the one considered in the bench-
mark model with two diﬀerences, the accumulation law of capital (equation
(11) instead of (2)) and the clearing condition of the labor market (equation
(10) instead of (4)). The interior solution of this optimization problem is










































where ω and λ are deﬁned as in subsection 2.1. The necessary conditions
with respect to knowledge, At,l a b o r ,Lt, and adoption, ut,a r en o ta l t e r e d .
As one can check, the second, third and fourth equation of the system just
13above, corresponding to the latter conditions, are the optimality conditions
(7), (8) and (9) of the central planner problem in the benchmark model.
The Euler equation (12) now incorporates the impact of maintenance on
capital accumulation. A change in the maintenance path over time aﬀects
the accumulation of capital and the paths of production and consumption.
A new optimality condition has to be taken into account. Equation (13)
characterizes indeed the optimal maintenance decision. The marginal beneﬁt
from maintaining the stock of capital (evaluated in terms of the marginal
utility of consumption) should be equal to the shadow wage, which is the
marginal cost of maintaining capital. We now provide a characterization of
the balanced growth paths.
3.2 Balanced growth paths
The balanced growth paths are deﬁn e da si ns u b s e c t i o n2 . 2 .I np a r t i c u l a r ,w e
are seeking paths where Lt, mt and ut are constant and comprised between
0 and 1, and where the other variables grow at a constant rate. It is not
diﬃcult to check that Proposition 1 still applies in our extension, that is
gA = γ,a n dgC = gK = gI = gY = γ
1
1−α. In order to come with an analytical
characterization as simple as possible of the existence and uniqueness issues,
we parameterize the depreciation function as follows:
δ(m)=a − cm
b
0 <b < 1
a>c > 0.
The restrictions on the values of the parameters are set to fulﬁll the require-
ments (i)-(ii) to be satisﬁed by an admissible depreciation function. 0 <b<1
is required for depreciationf u n c t i o nb ec o n v e x ,a n da>cmeans that the
“natural” depreciation rate, δ = a−c is positive. Parameter a is the capital
depreciation if the planner does not devote any labor to maintain capital
and a−c is the natural depreciation rate. With this speciﬁcation, the model

















γ − β(1 − duθ)
 























L + m + u =1
γ
1
1−α Y = AK
αL
1−α
The long-run system involves eight variables: L, u, m, C, Y , K, A and ω.I t
is possible to ﬁnd a set of suﬃcient conditions for an admissible solution to
exist and to be unique, and to derive some comparative statics.











(i) a unique steady solution exists with 0 <u<1, 0 <m<1 and 0 <L<1,
(ii) the following comparative statics apply:
(v) with respect to d, ∂u
∂d < 0, ∂m
∂d > 0, ∂L
∂d > 0,a n d∂TG
∂d < 0.
(vv) with respect to γ, ∂u
∂γ > 0 and ∂m




The proof of the proposition is extremely heavy, it is reported in the ap-
pendix. First let us comment on the assumption made in the proposition.
Quite straightforwardly, this assumption imposes a lower bound for the tech-
nological progress factor, γ. This lower bound depends mainly on the main-
tenance parameters a, b and c.S i n c e β < 1a n dγ > 1, and since the
parameters a and c are directly related to the capital depreciation rates, and
thus are small real numbers, our assumption should be very easily checked
except when b tends to 1. This never happens in our numerical experiments
as we will see later in this subsection.
15Much more importantly, the comparative statics results already give some
insight into the complex interactions at work in our model. In the case of
an exogenous improvement in the adoption technology, ie. when d rises, the
registered comparative statics are quite similar to those of the benchmark
model. Despite the adoption eﬀort is reduced, the technological gap goes
down as the product du θ decreases. The reduction in the labor allocation
for adoption permits the assignment of more labor resources to maintenance.
Maintenance and adoption work in opposite directions, and this property
seems to be one of the most salient outcomes of the model in several situ-
ations. Indeed, the same property arises in the case where a technological
acceleration occurs, ie. γ rises. The labor allocation to adoption increases
while labor on maintenance goes down. The fact that adoption and mainte-
nance move in opposite directions in both cases reﬂects mainly the arbitrage
between “productive” and “non-productive” labor, namely between L and
the sum u+m. Suppose that both adoption and maintenance increase in re-
sponse to a technological acceleration. Then labor allocation to production
and so to consumption is likely to decrease sharply. When only adoption
or maintenance labor shifts upward, this guarantees that in the worse case
labor allocation to production will only decrease slightly. Actually, the reac-
tion of variable L when γ changes is analytically ambiguous while it increases
clearly when d goes up. There is an easy explanation to this contrast. When
d varies, it has a unique direct eﬀect, namely on the imitation technology. It
results in a change in labor on adoption, and it only aﬀects the maintenance
labor via the labor resources constraint. In contrast, when γ moves, it does
not only aﬀect directly the adoption technology, it also enters explicitly the
optimal capital accumulation decision,4 which depends on m. Hence, when
γ moves, there are deﬁnitely more economic interactions and mechanisms at
work in comparison with the shock on d. As a consequence, while the latter
case permits a complete analytical characterization, the former does not.
The ambiguity in labor on production when γ shifts upward is responsible
for another ambiguity to arise: The technological gap can ap r i o r iincrease
or decrease under a technological acceleration, while it clearly goes up in the
benchmark model. Recall that TG=
γ−1
duθ as in the benchmark model. In the
latter model, a technological acceleration stimulates a bigger labor allocation
4Which is given by the ﬁr s te q u a t i o no ft h es t e a d ys t a t es y s t e mo fe q u a t i o n sl i s t e da t
the beginning of this subsection.
16to adoption. However, this rise in labor on adoption is not suﬃcient to
keep as close to the technological frontier as before the acceleration. When
maintenance is included, labor on adoption is additionally favored by the
decrease in maintenance, unless the labor resources freed by this reduction
in maintenance are ultimately assigned to production. Since the eﬀect of a
technological acceleration on L is ambiguous, so is its eﬀect on the magnitude
of adoption rise. This explains in turn the ambiguity of the technological gap
response.
3.3 Calibration
Since some comparative statics are analytically ambiguous, we resort to nu-
merical experiments. In order to compare rigorously the outcomes of the
benchmark model with those of the model with maintenance, we proceed as
follows:
(i) First, we calibrate the benchmark model. This allows to ﬁxt h ef o l -
lowing parameters: θ, α, β and γ and d.
(ii) Second, we introduce maintenance and we choose the parameters of
the maintenance function, namely the parameters a, b and c.
The results of the calibration procedure are given in Table 1. The ﬁrst step
of the calibration procedure produces, in particular, an adoption cost, ie. ωu
Y ,
close to 10% of GDP, and a ratio consumption to GDP near 70%. The main-
tenance parameters have been chosen as follows. a is ﬁxed in order to have
a capital depreciation rate equal to 12% in the absence of any maintenance
eﬀort. This value is in the range of values considered in the literature. The
parameters b and c have been ﬁxed to 0.24 and 0.117 respectively in order to
have a maintenance cost, ie. ωm
Y , around 4%, and a depreciation rate equal
to 0.3% when all labor resources are devoted to maintenance. Note that our
maintenance cost is not so far from the 6% ﬁgure of the Canadian survey.
In order to see how the economy behaves when the maintenance eﬀort is
lower, we consider an alternative parameterization which only diﬀers from
the previous one in the value assigned to c. Concretely, keeping all the other
parameters constant, and lowering c to from 0.117 to 0.11, the maintenance
eﬀort decreases from 0.04 to about 0.03. We shall refer to this parameter-
ization as the ”extended model 2”, whereas the former parameterization is
referred to as ”extended model 1”.
17The implications of these parameterizations on the steady equilibria are sum-
m a r i z e di nT a b l e2 .T h r e em a i no b s e r v a t i o n sc a nb em a d e :
(i) When maintenance is incorporated, the labor allocations to adoption
and production mechanically decrease. In all our numerical experiments, pro-
duction labor seems to decrease more than adoption labor (−4.3% and −2.9%
respectively when the benchmark model is compared to the extended model
1). In contrast, (detrended) capital and investment rise sharply (around 33%
for capital when the benchmark model is compared to the extended model
1).
(ii) One trade-oﬀ is already clear: As adoption labor goes down, the in-
corporation of maintenance labor increases the technological gap (1.7% and
1.2% when the benchmark model is compared to the extended models 1 and
2 respectively). That is to say the magnitude of the technological gap incre-
ment is deﬁnitely lower than the magnitude of the drop in adoption labor.
This property derives immediately from the assumption that the imitation
technology has decreasing returns with respect to labor.
(iii) Another trade-oﬀ has to be studied. If maintenance is incorporated,
production labor decreases but capital goes up. Moreover, adoption labor
decreases, which lowers the level of technological progress in the production
sector. Overall, the impact on (detrended) income is ambiguous. However,
the increment in the capital stock is so big that it more than compensates
the negative eﬀects of decreasing production and adoption labor allocations.
Indeed, detrended income rises by 13% (Resp. 10%) when the benchmark
model is compared to the extended model 1 (Resp. model 2).
The ﬁnding (iii) is highly interesting if one has in mind an under-developed
economy. In such a context, ﬁghting poverty is certainly the most impor-
tant objective, much more important than reducing the technological gap for
example. Said in other words, reducing the income gap is nowadays much
more crucial than technological catching up for such countries. Our simple
model suggests that an optimally designed maintenance policy will raise in-
come without worsening so much the technological gap. Does the presence
of maintenance also improve the responsiveness of the economy to policy
shocks? Will a trade or education reform work better when maintenance is
taken into account? We will study this issue in the next sub-section.
Before, let us numerically study the comparative statics with respect to γ,
which are, as we mentioned above, analytically intractable. We increase γ by
181% and compute the induced increments in m, u , L and TGrelative to the
increment in γ. Table 3 summarizes the results. As expected, this technolog-
ical acceleration is associated with an increase in the adoption or imitation
eﬀort and with a decreasing labor allocation to production and maintenance
labor. It should be noted that the change in production labor is very small
(around −0.03%) while the increment in adoption labor is more substantial
(near 0.6%). The magnitude of the resulting drop in maintenance labor is
consequently close to the adoption labor increment. That is a technolog-
ical acceleration induces a kind of swap of maintenance activity for more
adoption. Nonetheless, and exactly as in the benchmark model, this higher
adoption eﬀort is not suﬃcient to reduce the long term technological gap.
In our models, reducing the long term technological gap through a strong
enough adoption eﬀo r ti sa l w a y si n c o m p a t i b l ew i t hw e l f a r em a x i m i z a t i o n .
3.4 Policy shocks, maintenance and long term income
In our models, trade or education policy shocks may be studied via the exoge-
nous variable d, which plays the role of a productivity factor in the imitation
technology. For example, a trade reform facilitating technology transfers may
be captured through a positive shock to variable d. We may model exogenous
improvements in human capital exactly in the same way. Table 4 summarizes
the response of the economy to a 1% shock on d. By Proposition 3, we know
that such a shock induces a drop in the adoption eﬀort and an increase in
both production and maintenance labor. Moreover, we know from the same
proposition that the technological gap should decrease. However, we don’t
know the magnitude of the response of each labor allocation, which in turn
disables us to conclude anything about the output response.
Table 4 is quite informative regarding these issues. While adoption labor
decreases by about 0.5%, production and maintenance labor allocations only
increase by 0.05% and 0.07% respectively in the case of the extended model
1 (less in the case of the extended model 2). This is enough to push long
term output upwards. Moreover, it should be noted that the output response
to the policy shock is higher when maintenance is an alternative choice to
adoption and production. Without maintenance, long term output raises by
0.1975%. In the extended model 1, output is raised by 0.2%. Of course, the
diﬀerence between the two ﬁgures is not big, but it is not negligible.
19It is likely that maintenance matters much more in the income response to
technology or policy shocks when the latter are more directly related to the
capital sector. An elementary way to get this point is to study the response of
the economy to a change in the production function of capital goods. Assume
for example that the parameter a = δ decreases permanently by 1%. Table 5
g i v e st h er e s u l t so ft h ee x p e r i m e n t .W ithout maintenance, long term output
raises by 0.31%. In the extended model 1, output is raised by 0.43%. In such
a case, the improvement in the capital sector technology induces a sharp
increase in maintenance (1.12%). In contrast, labor allocation to adoption
and production, and the resulting technological gap, are only slightly altered.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have provided a simple theory of capital maintenance and
technology adoption using optimal growth models ` al aNelson and Phelps
where the labor resources of an economy can be allocated freely either to
production, adoption or maintenance. There are very few papers dealing
with maintenance, and a fortiori with the role of capital maintenance in
technological choices. In this paper, we analyze a situation where adop-
tion and maintenance ”compete” for labor resources. This is only one of
the channels through which the two activities interact, as we explain in the
introduction. Though this is certainly the easiest way to relate adoption
to maintenance, the considered model proves very rich in terms of induced
economic mechanisms and interactions, and sheds light on some important
properties of maintenance.
Beside mathematically characterizing the optimal allocation of labor across
the three activities, we prove for example that equilibrium maintenance and
adoption operate in opposite directions when technological or policy shocks
occur. Maintenance is a kind of substitute to adoption in such cases. Much
more importantly, we ﬁnd that though capital maintenance deepens the tech-
nological gap by diverting labor resources from adoption, it generally in-
creases the long run output level at equilibrium. As we claim in the last
section, this is a very interesting result for the proponents of a development
theory primarily concerned with ﬁghting poverty, with raising the income per
capital in under-developed countries, and not with technological catching up.
Moreover reducing the long term technological gap trough a strong enough
20adoption eﬀort is, in our models, incompatible with welfare maximization.
However, we ﬁnd that the long term output response to policy shocks is only
slightly higher in the presence of maintenance.
O b v i o u s l y ,m u c hw o r kr e m a i n st od of o ram u c hc o m p r e h e n s i v ea p p r a i s a l
of the role of maintenance as a determinant of technological choices. Beside
endogenizing growth, which is not a very hard task, more fundamental reﬁne-
ments have to be undertaken. For example, one may think that maintenance
plays a more crucial role if technological advances are embodied in capital
goods, and this may reinforce the conclusions of this paper. On the other
hand, one may ﬁnd questionable our assumption according to which adoption
and maintenance use the same input (labor), it would be then useful to ex-
amine the properties of alternative models where adoption and maintenance
do not use exactly the same combination of inputs. All these issues are in
our research agenda.
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236 Appendix
1. Proof of Proposition 2: The proof is simple. Indeed, by the means
of successive substitutions, one can reduce the system of eight equilibrium
restrictions above to a single implicit equation involving only u:
H(u)=βθ(γ − 1)(1 − u) − (1 − α)u
 




It could be easily checked that H(u) is a decreasing and concave function
which tends to βθ(γ−1) when u tends to zero, and to −(1−α)[γ − β(1 − d)]
when u tends to one. Since γ > 1, β < 1a n dd>0, we have [γ − β(1 − d)]
> 0. Thus there exists an unique u∗ ∈ (0,1) which satisﬁes H(u)=0 .
This establishes property (i). The comparative statics are derived explicitly.






























Since (1 − α)θ[1 − β(1 − duθ)] <R , ∂TG
∂γ < 0. 
2. Proof of Proposition 3: We can reduce the steady state equilibrium
conditions to two equations in (m,u).
m = g(u)=1− u −
(1 − α)u[γ − β(1 − duθ)]
βθ(γ − 1)
(14)










=0 ( 1 5 )
T h en e g a t i v es l o p eo ff u n c t i o ng in (14) is obvious. Concerning (15), one can
apply the implicit function theorem. F(m,u)d e ﬁnes m as a diﬀerentiable
24function of u,( m = f(u)) and f (u)=− Fu
Fm.S i n c eFu and Fm are negative
(Fm < 0 is assured by the restriction on the parameters imposed in proposi-
tion 3), the slope of the implicit function f is also negative. We now check
that g is above f when u tends to zero, and g is below f when u tends to



















− 1+a =0 .
The ﬁrst term of the previous equation deﬁnes a decreasing function of m





β − 1+a, it follows that 0 <f(0) < 1, so g(0) >f(0).
















Therefore, the system (14)-(15) deﬁnes two (m,u)-curves which intersect
only once when both m and u vary in the interval (0,1). Which establishes
property (i).
As for the comparative statics, we consider the following system of equations:
(F)1 − a + cm
b +








(G) β(1 − u − m)θ(γ − 1) − (1 − α)u
 
















where the ﬁrst, second and third columns of J refer to the partial derivatives
of the left hand sides of the equations of the system with respect to u, m,a n d
TG. It is easy to check that Fu, Fm, Gu, Gm and Hu are all strictly negative.
The Jacobian determinant (FuGm − FmGu) is thus strictly negative:
















γ − β(1 − du
θ)+βdθu
θ 
(1 − α)Fm < 0. (16)






















d2uθ > 0a n dHd =
(γ−1)θ
duθ+1 . Taking into account (16) and (17),
























Developing the previous expression, we can easily check that ∂TG




    < 1. Indeed :
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θd
u
|GdFm| = |Fm|(1 − α)βdθu

























[GγFu − GuFγ] < 0
26where Gγ =
(1−α)u[1−β(1−duθ)]
































being ambiguous, so is the sign of ∂TG
∂γ .
Let us ﬁnally study the comparative statics concerning L, the labor input in
production. First, it should be noted that ∂L













−Gd (Fu − Fm)
|detJ|
.
Developing a bit more the numerator of the previous expression, it is easy to
check that the negative eﬀect of d on adoption labor is not compensated by
the increment in m. In order to satisfy the labor restriction (1 = L+m+u),

























it is ambiguous. A quick look at the expressions of ∂m
∂γ and ∂u
∂γ is suﬃcient to
understand this result. The sign of the diﬀerence of the two latter expression
depends on the values of the parameters of the maintenance function with
respect to the those of the adoption technology, and there is no ap r i o r irela-
tionship between the two sets of parameters. The numerical results reported
in the main text make clear that the sign of ∂L
∂γ does eﬀectively depend on
the parameterization. 
27Table 1: Parameterization
a = δ b c θ d α β γ
0.12 0.24 0.117 0.55 0.8 0.35 0.97 1.033
T a b l e2 :S t e a d ys t a t e sp r o p e r t i e s
Benchmark model Extended model 1 Extended model 2
m — 0.0409275 0.03076
u 0.0909791 0.0882704 0.0889465
l 0.909021 0.870802 0.880293
A 0.866422 0.864486 0.864977
TG 0.154172 0.156757 0.1561
K 1.67622 2.57892 2.33979
I 0.273016 0.286748 0.284579
Y 0.928166 1.04717 1.01984
C 0.65515 0.760419 0.73526
wu
Y 0.099298 0.0866475 0.08932
wm
Y — 0.0401751 0.0308
I
Y 0.294146 0.273832 0.279043























28Table 4. The long term eﬀects of a 1% increase in d
Benchmark model Extended model 1 Extended model 2
 u
 d −0.50066 −0.501 −0.5009
 m
 d 0.0705 0.0692
 L
 d 0.05 0.0474 0.04816
 TG
 d −0.716 −0.7161 −0.7186
 Y
 d 0.1975 0.2003 0.20003
 I
 d 0.1977 0.19864 0.198538
  I
Y
 d 0 −0.001713 −0.001
 w∗u
Y
 d −0.7466 −0.7477 −0.7473
 w∗m
Y
 d −0.17755 −0.178688
Table 5. The long term eﬀects of a 1% decrease in a = δ
Benchmark model Extended model 1 Extended model 2
 u
 a 0 −0.03463 −0.2358
 m
 a 1.12133 1.02751
 L
 a 0 −0.04919 −0.3352
 TG
 a 0 0.01905 0.01297
 Y
 a 0.315412 0.430571 0.4
 I
 a 0.203695 0.178958 0.1931
  I
Y
 a −0.11136 −0.250534 −0.2069
 C
 a 0.361967 0.525452 0.481423
 w∗u
Y
 a −0.360661 −0.50822 −0.4692
 w∗m
Y
 a 0.642269 0.57717
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